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1. Introduction 
Given the creation of corporate governance scores for individual firms in the last decade or so, 
there has been a considerable amount of time devoted towards examining the relationship between the 
quality of corporate governance practices and various firm-level characteristics. Two of the most 
common relationships studied has been that between corporate governance and firm value and corporate 
governance and corporate dividend payout (see for example, Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 
2005, 2007; Chi, 2005; Black et al, 2007; Gompers et al, 2003; Bebchuk et al, 2009, 2012; Chen et al, 2009; 
and Brown and Caylor, 2006, for studies which explore the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm value, and Mitton, 2004; Chae et al, 2009; Jiraporn et al, 2006, 2011; Sawicki, 2009; John and 
Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007; Shao et al, 2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; and Bartram et al, 2012, 
who all explore the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and corporate dividend or 
total payout).1 In the case of the former literature, most of these studies conclude that there is a positive, 
causal relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Better-governed firms are worth more, 
and improvements in corporate governance, for example, via exchange-traded cross-listings in the U.S., 
enhance value (see for example, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004, 2009). The findings of the latter 
literature support both a positive and negative relationship between corporate governance and dividend 
payout. On the one hand, Mitton (2004), Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010), Jiraporn et al. (2011), and 
Bartram et al. (2012) conclude that dividends are an outcome of strong governance i.e. there is a positive 
relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout, such that better-governed firms pay the 
largest dividends. On the other hand, others suggest that dividends substitute for poor governance i.e. there 
is a negative relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout (see for example, Jiraporn et 
al, 2006; Sawicki, 2009, for Asian firms in pre-crisis Asia, John and Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007).  
In more recent years, the focus of both literatures has shifted away from examining the 
relationship between composite measures of corporate governance and firm-level outcomes, towards a 
greater desire to better understand the relationship between governance and firm characteristics, by 
examining the relationship between the individual governance provisions which makeup the composite 
                                                 
1 Others focus on the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance (see Klapper and 
Love, 2004), corporate governance and capital structure (see Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat, 2006; Jiraporn and 
Gleason, 2007; Harford, Li and Zhao, 2008), governance and corporate diversification (see Jiraporn et al, 2006), and 
corporate governance and liquidity (see Chung, Elder and Kim, 2010).   
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governance measures and the aforementioned firm characteristics. For example, Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
show that only six of the original twenty-four (governance) provisions of the G-Index (Gompers et al, 
2003) account for the relationship between corporate governance and firm value uncovered by Gompers 
et al. (2003). Furthermore, Black et al. (2011) show that one-size does not fit all, since the same 
governance provisions, adopted in different countries can have very different effects on firm value.2 The 
governance/dividend literature has also evolved in the same way. For example, Jiraporn et al. (2011) show 
that corporate dividend payout in the U.S. is an outcome of a number of individual governance provisions, 
namely board structure and composition (board), audit function (audit), executive and director 
compensation (compensation), and progressive practices (e.g. the performance of the board is reviewed 
on a regular basis).3 They also show that dividend payouts are much higher in firms where 
charters/bylaws supress shareholder rights i.e. dividends substitute for poor shareholder rights.  
In this paper, I build on the work of Mitton (2004), and focus on identifying the exact individual  
corporate governance provisions, which when included together in a single composite corporate 
governance measure, led Mitton (2004) to conclude that in emerging markets, corporate dividends are an 
outcome of firm (and country) governance.4 The motives behind doing so are threefold. First, and as 
already alluded to above, we know from the extant literature that dividends are an outcome of strong 
governance in emerging markets (Mitton, 2004), but we do not know which governance provisions, either 
individually or collectively, are positively related to corporate dividend payout. In this paper, I fill this 
void. Second, much of the recent literature in this area which examines the relationship between the 
strength of individual corporate governance provisions and corporate dividend payout focuses on U.S. 
(Jiraporn et al, 2011) and Canadian firms (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010). The corporate governance (see 
Black et al, 2011) and the payout literature (see for example Aivazian et al, 2003) suggest that the findings 
from these studies cannot be readily inferred for emerging market firms. Third, while some studies do 
focus on the relationship between individual governance provisions and corporate dividend policy in 
                                                 
2 For example, they show that board structure (i.e. a measure which captures among others the independence of the 
board of directors and the existence or not of audit and fiscal committees) enhances firm value in India and Korea 
(Republic), but destroys value in Brazil.   
3 Note that Jiraporn et al (2011) estimate a series of logit and ordinary least squares regressions. These regressions 
suggest that dividend payout increases in the quality of board and audit functions, but neither of these to provisions 
influences the decision to pay a dividend in the first instance.   
4 Mitton (2004) shows that corporate dividend payout is an outcome of corporate and country governance. In this 
paper, I concentrate on focusing on the exact determinants of the relationship between individual corporate 
governance provisions and corporate dividend payout.    
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emerging market countries, they concentrate on specific individual corporate governance provisions but 
exclude others, which are potentially correlated with the included provision. Consequently, these studies 
run the risk that the estimated coefficients on the individual provisions are biased because of the failure to 
account for the other governance provisions in their empirical framework. In this paper, I account for 
other governance provisions in all regressions, thus reducing the likelihood of omitted variable bias.      
To perform these tests, I collect a sample of 220 firms from 21 emerging market countries. Like 
Mitton (2004), I test the agency models of dividends using shareholder rights measured at the corporate 
level (i.e. corporate governance) by employing the corporate governance scores complied by Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001). I begin by reconfirming the findings of Mitton (2004) and show 
that in emerging markets, dividend payout is an outcome of strong corporate governance. In subsequent 
tests, I show that dividend payout is an outcome of board independence and accountability. I find weak 
evidence which suggests that opaque firms substitute a lack of transparency for higher dividends.     
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I present a brief literature review and develop 
three hypotheses. From here, I describe the data and present the empirical findings. I end with some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In this paper I empirically test two agency models of dividends, namely the outcome and substitution 
models of La Porta et al. (2000). Since La Porta et al. (2000), much of the subsequent empirical literature 
which followed focused on the relationship between dividend payout and composite country and/or 
corporate governance measures (e.g. Mitton, 2004; Chae et al, 2009; Jiraporn et al, 2011; Sawicki, 2009; 
John and Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007; Shao et al, 2009; Brockman and Unlu, 2009, 2011; Jo and Pan, 
2009; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; Bartram et al, 2012; and Byrne and O’Connor, 2012). More recent 
work has tended to focus on the relationship between the individual constituent components of the 
composite governance measures and corporate dividend payout (e.g. Jiraporn et al, 2011; Adjaoud and Ben-
Amar, 2010; Chen et al, 2005; Zhang, 2008; Al Shabibi and Ramesh, 2010; Bartram et al, 2012; and 
Sharma, 2011). Irrespective of the focus of either strand of this literature, both set about to test the 
theoretical predictions of the outcome and substitution models of dividends.               
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The outcome and substitution models of dividends are both theoretically grounded in Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow hypothesis. Both agency models agree that dividends paid to shareholders serve to reduce 
agency costs. In the case of the outcome model, dividends serve to reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flow (Chae et al, 2009), since the shareholders of better-governed firms do not demand larger dividends 
when firms have growth opportunities and/or are financially-constrained (see Mitton, 2004; Chae et al, 
2009; Bartram et al, 2012). The substitution model suggests that poorly-governed firms pay reputationally-
enhancing large dividends to reduce their financing constraints. Financially-constrained firms are those 
firms are those that, by definition, have identified positive net present value projects, do not have 
sufficient internal capital to funds these projects, and face too high a cost to fund externally. By 
definition, these firms are very much likely to be ‘immature’.  Coupled with the fact these young, 
‘immature’ firms are unprofitable, there is no (positive) free cash flow. Hence, in the case of the 
substitution model, dividends serve to reduce the agency costs of poor governance (but not free cash flow), 
and dividends paid serve as a means of communicating to external investors that their investment will not 
be consumed privately.  
While both agency models agree that dividend paid reduce agency costs, they disagree on the 
relationship between the strength of corporate governance and dividend payouts. Let’s elaborate. Since 
expropriation of free cash flow by self-serving insiders is value-decreasing for minority shareholders, 
shareholders prefer dividends to retained earnings.5 The outcome model suggests that the ability of 
shareholders to force firms to pay a dividend in the first instance, and then the dividend amount relies 
crucially on the efficiency of the firm’s corporate governance practices. Hence, the outcome model of 
dividends predicts that, all else equal, the likelihood of a firm initiating or paying a dividend in any period, 
and the dividend amount (payout) is greatest when free cash flow exists and where shareholder rights are 
strong.6 In effect, dividends are an outcome of strong corporate governance (and free cash flow). In the 
period subsequent to the publication of the La Porta et al. (2000) paper, numerous studies have found 
support in favour of the outcome model using shareholder rights proxies measured at the country and/or 
                                                 
5 But are prepared to substitute lower current dividends for (expected) higher future dividends given firm growth and 
good governance (see Mitton, 2004; and Bartram et al, 2012).  
6 Using a sample of U.S. firms, Chae et al. (2009) show that dividend payout increases in both corporate governance 
and the amount of free cash flow. However, in the absence of free cash flow, dividend payout actually decreases in 
the strength of corporate governance i.e. the substitution model prevails. 
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corporate level (Mitton, 2004; Chae et al, 2009; Jiraporn et al, 2011; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; 
Bartram et al, 2012; Sawicki, 2009, in post-Asian crisis Asia, Shao et al, 2009; Brockman and Unlu, 2009, 
2011; and Byrne and O’Connor, 2012). Using composite level governance measures, the aforementioned 
studies all conclude that dividend payout is an outcome of either corporate or country governance or 
both. In addition, some of these same aforementioned studies and others (Chen et al, 2005; Yarram, 
2010; Al Shabibi and Ramesh, 2010; and Sharma, 2011) show that dividend payouts are higher i.e. the 
outcome model prevails when board of directors are predominantly independent (Chen et al, 2005; 
Sharma, 2011; Yarram, 2010; and Al Shabibi and Ramesh, 2010), when independent director tenure 
increases (Sharma, 2011), when the chair of the board of directors and the CEO are not the same person 
i.e. duality (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010), and when the audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees are predominantly independent (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; and Jiraporn et al, 2011).7 
Brockman and Unlu (2009), Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) show that the outcome 
model of dividends prevails when shareholder and creditor rights are strong. When the rights of the latter 
are weak, and even when the rights of the former are strong, creditors demand, and firms consent to 
lower dividends. Hence the agency cost of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends 
suggests that the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount is an outcome of strong 
shareholder and creditor rights.8            
On the other hand, the substitution model predicts a negative relationship between governance 
(country and/or corporate) and corporate dividend payout. In effect, dividends in their agency role 
substitute for poor corporate governance. Consequently, the substitution model predicts that all else equal, 
dividend payouts decrease in shareholder rights.9 Thus, poorly governed firms pay the largest dividends. 
                                                 
7 Some studies group a number of ‘board of director’ characteristics together in a single composite index and show 
that dividend payout is positively related to board characteristics (Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 2010; and Jiraporn et al, 
2011). Consequently, since they do not examine the relationship between either of these board characteristics and 
dividend payout, I, or others, cannot say with certainty whether it is, for example, board independence or perhaps 
independence of the audit committee which causes the positive relationship between “Board Characteristics” and 
dividend payout.     
8 This then suggests an alternative substitution model which is inclusive of the agency costs of debt and equity. 
Creditors substitute lower dividends for poor legal protection. In addition, Shao et al. (2009) show that effect of 
creditor rights on dividends is much lower given poor shareholder rights.   
9 Of course an alternative to paying large dividends would be to improve corporate governance, which in turn would 
reduce the firms cost of capital. However, in some countries, most notably those with poorly developed financial 
markets, the net benefit of governance improvements even for firms with an external financing need is negative 
(Doidge et al, 2007). Hence, for these firms, increased dividends may represent a much less costly bonding 
mechanism when compared to the costs of improving their corporate governance practices. The short-term costs of 
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In contrast to the predictions of the outcome model, (poorly governed) firms voluntarily, rather than 
under duress from shareholders (of firms with efficient governance), pay dividends.10 Using composite and 
individual governance measures, there exists plenty of empirical support for the substitution model (John 
and Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2007; Jo and Pan, 2009; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Chae et al, 2009; Sawicki, 
2009, in pre-Asian crisis Asia; and Mitton, 2004, in civil law countries only, all find support in favour of 
the substitution model of dividends).11 Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the substitution model 
prevails in countries where disclosure environments are opaque and the outcome model in countries 
where disclosure environments are transparent. Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) find 
support in favour of the substitution model where creditor rights are weak. The exact governance 
mechanisms which are negatively correlated to dividend payout are, managerial representation on the 
board (Zhang, 2009), independent director workload (Sharma, 2011), and the share of equity in the total 
compensation package of independent directors (Sharma, 2011).  
 
3. Data 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and 
corporate dividend policy in emerging markets. To measure the strength of corporate governance I use 
the corporate governance scores developed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 2001). These 
governance ratings have been used by many in a variety of settings. As I do in this paper, Mitton (2004) 
examines the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy; Klapper and Love (2004) 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance; Durnev and Kim (2005) corporate 
governance and firm value, and more recently Chen et al. (2009), who examine the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                        
paying large dividends for poorly governed firms are the costs associated with forgone positive NPV projects and 
costly external finance (which presumably will decrease once reputation has been established). Alternatively, these 
same firms could improve their governance by cross-listing as an exchange-traded ADR in the U.S. The costs are 
large and tend to result in enhanced governance through reputational as opposed to legal bonding. Interestingly, 
when firms cross-list as Level 2/3 ADRs, they pay less dividends (see O’Connor, 2006; and Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 
2010), which suggests that enhanced governance substitutes for dividends for these firms.   
10 Of course better-governed firms may voluntarily pay higher dividends, but the outcome model predicts that 
shareholders use their legal rights to extract dividends from firms.    
11 The results of these tests using U.S. firms are mixed. Using the anti-takeover governance index of Gompers et al. 
(2003) to measure the strength of corporate governance of U.S. firms, John and Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2007), Jo 
and Pan (2009), and Jiraporn and Ning (2006) find in favour of the substitution model. Again using U.S. firms, but 
now using governance data from the Institutional Shareholder Services, Jiraporn et al. (2011) find evidence in favour 
of the outcome model. The ISS data is a much broader corporate governance measure than the G-Index, which in 
turn, likely explains the conflicting findings.  
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corporate governance and firm value via the cost of equity capital.12 The CLSA governance ratings range 
from 0 to 100 with higher values suggesting better corporate governance. The rating for each individual 
firm, for which there is 495 in total across 25 countries, is a composite of 57 qualitative, binary (Yes/No) 
questions which span seven distinct governance categories, namely management discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social awareness. The first six governance 
provisions have a 15% weighting in the composite index, while the last remaining category, namely social 
awareness has a 10% weighting. The rating for each firm is constructed by CLSA analysts. In this paper, I 
use only the first six governance provisions to construct the composite governance measure since 
dividend payout is unlikely to be related to social awareness. Consequently, the composite corporate 
governance score that I use in this paper is an equally weighed average of the first six corporate 
governance provisions. A sample of some of the questions in each governance category is listed below. 
1. Discipline. Has the company issued a “mission statement” that explicitly places a priority on 
good corporate governance? Does the company’s annual report include a section devoted to the 
company’s performance in implementing corporate governance principles?   
2. Transparency. Are accounts presented according to IGAAP? Does the company consistently 
disclose major and market sensitive information punctually?  
3. Independence. Is the chairman an independent, nonexecutive director? Does the company have 
an audit committee? Is it (the audit committee) chaired by a perceived genuine independent 
director?   
4. Accountability. Are the board members and members of the executive/management committee 
substantially different? Do independent, nonexecutive directors account for more than 50% of 
the board?   
5. Responsibility. Are there mechanisms to allow punishment of the executive/management 
committee in the event of mismanagement? Is the board small enough to be efficient and 
effective? (If more than 12 answer “No”).    
6. Fairness. Do all equity holders have the right to call General Meetings? Are voting methods 
easily accessible?  
   
                                                 
12 The CLSA (2001) governance measures are far from perfect. For example, two of the major criticisms of the 
scores are, first, they suffer from subjectivity bias since some of the answers to the questions are not “matter-of-
fact”, but instead completed based on the experiences of the analyst who covers each firm. Nevertheless, Durnev 
and Kim (2007) do show that the bias is likely to be low since they find that firms reported for corporate 
misdemeanors do score low in the CLSA (2001) governance measure. Second, there is some overlap in the different 
categories. For example, the question “Are the board members and members of the executive/management 
committee substantially different?” is placed in the accountability section but could easily, without controversy be 
placed under the independence heading.        
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I use three different dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-earnings (%), measured as 
dividends per share divided by earnings per share, dividends-to-cashflow (%), measured as dividends per 
share divided by cashflow per share, and dividends-to-sales (%), measured as cash dividends (paid to 
common and preferred shareholders) divided by net sales. All data is sourced from Worldscope at the end 
of year 2001. In all regressions, I control for firm size, firm profitability, firm growth, cash, total equity 
and retained earnings. Size is measured as the log of book assets in US$, growth is the logarithmic one-
year asset growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) to book assets, cash is cash 
scaled by book assets, total equity is total shareholders’ equity also scaled by book assets, and finally 
retained earnings is retained earnings again scaled by book assets. Consistent with the life-cycle model of 
dividends (see Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002; De Angelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2006; Bulan, 
Subramanian and Tanlu, 2007; and Denis and Osobov, 2008), size, profitability, and retained earnings are 
expected to positively influence dividend policy, while high growth firms typically pay smaller dividends. 
Finally, the expected relationship between cash holdings, total equity and dividend payout is ambiguous. 
For example, firms with high cash reserves but with little or no demand for external finance are likely to 
pay a dividend. In contrast, those firms with anticipated future growth opportunities may finance this 
growth with their cash reserves, and refrain from paying a dividend.13 All firm level variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.             
I include two country level determinants of dividend policy, namely shareholder and creditor 
rights. The literature suggests that dividends can be an outcome of, or substitute for shareholder and creditor 
rights (La Porta et al, 2000; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Shao et al, 2009; and Byrne and O’Connor, 2012). 
I use the revised version of the anti-director rights measure from Spamann (2010) to account for the 
strength of shareholder rights at the country-level. Since this data is missing for China, Hungary, and 
Poland, I use the Djankov et al. (2008) measure of shareholder rights for these countries. The creditor 
rights measure is taken from Djankov et al. (2007), and ranges from a low of zero to a high of four, where 
                                                 
13 The ambiguity surrounding the relationship between cash holdings and dividend payout is grounded in how one 
perceives the nature of the relationship between corporate cash holdings and firm-level financing constraints. 
Fazzari et al. (2000) and the proponents of the cash flow sensitivity of cash approach to estimating firm-level 
financing constraints (see Almeida et al, 2004) suggest that financial-constrained firms hoard cash (and pay little or 
no dividends). In contrast, others (see Cleary, 2005) suggest that the very existence of cash reserves suggests that 
firms are not financially-constrained, since these firms can finance internally rather than externally. Presumably these 
firms also pay a dividend.     
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higher values represent greater levels of creditor protection. A priori, the sign on the shareholder and 
creditor rights variables are expected to be positive. From my original sample, I lose 275 firms because of 
missing firm-level data, which results in a final sample of 220 firms.           
The final sample of firms is presented in Table 1. It comprises of 220 firms from 21 countries.  
They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea 
(Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Turkey. The number of firms varies considerably by country. Taiwan (31 firms) followed 
by Hong Kong (25) and Malaysia (22) supply the largest number of firms. In contrast, there are just a 
single firm from Argentina, Colombia, Hungary, and Peru. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 
contain the median and standard deviation corporate governance score by country. They suggest that the 
median firm is better governed in Peru (76.5), then Singapore (67.4), followed closely by the sole firm 
from Argentina (66.7). In contrast and when compared to other firms, the median firm is poorly 
governed in Pakistan (33.6) and Poland (37.7).14 Interestingly, while the median firm from Pakistan has 
the lowest governance score in this sample of firms, the greatest variation in governance scores occurs in 
Pakistan (standard deviation of 20.2). Hence, there are firms in Pakistan which are much better governed 
than their median counterpart. There is much less variation in corporate governance practices in Mexico 
(standard deviation of 4.0), Chile (4.2), and Korea (5.8). Overall, the median firm has a corporate 
governance score of 55.8, with a standard deviation of 14.6.15  
In the fifth to tenth columns of Table 1, I outline the median and standard deviation dividend 
payout by country, using all three dividend payout measures. They suggest that as a percentage of 
                                                 
14 A large literature exists which examines the firm and country-level factors which promote firms to practice better 
corporate governance (see Klapper and Love, 2004; and Durnev and Kim, 2005, 2007). These ‘governance-
predictions’ studies find that amongst others, large firms, firms with a need for external finance, and firms with large 
proportion of ‘soft/intangible’ assets practice good corporate governance. They also find that corporate governance 
improves with ownership concentration, provided there is no deviation from one-share-one-vote (i.e., dual-class 
firms typically have poorer governance than single-class share firms). Cross-listing firms and firms domiciled where 
country governance (e.g., shareholder rights strong, efficient judiciary) is strong also tend to be better-governed. 
However, Doidge et al. (2007) show that some firms with these ‘desirable’ characteristics may not necessarily 
practice better governance, since the costs of doing so can outweigh the perceived benefits. The costs of doing so 
are greater where financial development weak. Aggarwal et al. (2009) highlight the differences in governance 
practices between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, and show that amongst others, differences in financial development 
between the U.S. and non-U.S. countries can explain part of the superior governance practices of U.S. firms. 
Furthermore, recent work suggests that some firms do not adopt ‘desirable’ aspects of corporate governance since 
their adoption can prove to be value-decreasing (see Black et al, 2011).     
15 Klapper and Love (2004) show that the variation in corporate governance ratings (using CLSA corporate 
governance scores) decreases as country level investor protection increases.   
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earnings, the median firm in Hungary (85.5%) followed closely by the median firm in Pakistan (76.8%) 
pay the largest dividends. In contrast, dividend payouts tend to be much lower in the Philippines (5.3%) 
and Korea (5.9%). The sole firms from Argentina and Poland pay no dividend in 2001. When scaling 
dividends by either either cashflow or sales, dividend payouts tend to be high in Colombia (median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 82.2% and 6.0%, respectively), and Pakistan 
(median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 71.1% and 9.7%, respectively). Using 
either of these two payout measures, the median firm pays much lower dividends in Brazil (the median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) is 9.5% and 2.9%, respectively), Korea (the median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) is 3.0% and 0.2%, respectively), and Taiwan (the 
median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) is 9.3% and 1.1%, respectively). In the full 
sample, the median firm pays 23.4%, 15.4%, and 2.2%, of its earnings, cashflow, or sales, respectively, as 
a dividend.   
The remaining columns of Table 1 contain the shareholder (SR) and creditor rights (CR) data. 
Shareholders tend to enjoy considerable legal rights in Brazil (Revised ADR is 5), Chile (5), Pakistan (5), 
South Africa (5), and Taiwan (5). In contrast, shareholder rights are much lower in China (1). Creditor 
rights (CR) are strong in Hong Kong (Creditor Rights is 4) and Hong Kong (4), but much weaker in 
Colombia (0), Mexico (0), and Peru (0). To mention but two, Colombia and Peru provides shareholders 
with much greater protection than creditors (SR is 4 and CR is 0 in both countries). In general, 
shareholder rights tend to much greater than creditor rights in these countries.    
In Table 2, I present the median and standard deviation of each of the corporate governance 
provisions by country. There is significant variation in governance provisions both across and within 
countries. Across countries, corporations tend to be most disciplined in Peru (77.8) and Mexico (72.3), 
while much less so in Poland (11.1) and Hungary (22.2). The greatest variation occurs in Pakistan 
(standard deviation of 26.5). Firms tend to be transparent in Chile (90.0) and Peru (90.0) and opaque in 
Poland (20.0) and Pakistan (31.7). Independence (Accountability) is greatest in Singapore and Taiwan (85.7) 
(Poland (100)), and much less so in Turkey (28.6) (China, Hungary and Turkey). Finally, the most 
responsible firms are in Chile and Hong Kong (Both 83.3), and the fairest in Singapore (88.9). There also 
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exists considerable variation in governance provisions within countries. For example, China scores at or 
above the sample median in 2 provisions (Fairness and Transparency), and below in the other four.   
In Table 3 I present some correlation coefficients, and more formal tests for multicollinearity 
(variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition numbers). 16 The top panel contains the correlations 
between each individual corporate governance provision and their composite. Each individual corporate 
governance provisions composite is calculated as the equally weighted average of the other five remaining 
governance provisions. For example the governance composite for discipline is an equally-weighted average 
of transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility and fairness.17 As expected, the correlations suggest that 
the governance provisions tend to be highly correlated with one another. Of the six individual governance 
provisions, responsibility is most highly correlated with its composite (0.563). The large and significant 
correlations among the individual governance provisions suggest that the possible exclusion of any of the 
corporate governance composite measures in the regression specifications is likely to bias the coefficient 
estimates of the individual corporate governance provision. Hence, in the regressions that follow, I 
include the corporate governance composite of each individual governance provision in regressions 
where the relationship between each individual governance provision and corporate dividend payout is 
estimated.  
Finally, in the middle panel of Table 3, I present the correlations between each of the six 
governance provisions and the three dividend payout measures. All of the correlation coefficients are 
positive, and statistically significant for all provisions bar corporate discipline. Corporate responsibility is 
most highly correlated with dividend payout. The correlation coefficients range from 0.253 (dividends to 
cashflow (%)) to a high of 0.278 (dividends to sales (%)).          
     
                                                 
16 The inclusion of each individual corporate governance provision with its governance composite may lead to issues 
of multicollinearity i.e. correlation among the independent variables. The correlation coefficients suggest that this is 
unlikely to be the case i.e. a general rule of thumb suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue provided 
the correlation coefficients are less than 0.7. Nevertheless, in the bottom panel of Table 3, I explore this possibility 
by presenting for each individual corporate governance provision, variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition 
numbers. Both measures suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue since the variance inflation factors and 
condition numbers are very low. The condition numbers were generated using the STATA procedure “Collin” (see 
Ender, 2010).     
17 It is important to make a clear distinction between the governance composite measures for the individual 
governance provisions and the composite corporate governance measure used in Table 3. The former is an equally-
weighted average of five individual governance provisions. The latter is an equally-weighted average of all six 
individual governance provisions.     
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4. Empirical Findings 
In this section I examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate dividend 
payout. I begin by exploring the relationship between the composite corporate governance and dividend 
payout. Then, I turn my attention towards examining the relationship between the individual components 
of the composite corporate governance measure and corporate dividend payout. As a precursor, consider 
Table 4. Here I divide the full sample of firms into two groups. The first group (High Governance) is 
made up of firms with a corporate governance score higher than the sample median (55.8). These firms 
are better-governed firms. The other group (Low Governance) is comprised of those firms with a 
corporate governance score less than the sample median. When compared to their “High-Governance” 
peers, these firms are less well-governed. For both groups of firms and using each dividend payout 
measure, I outline their median dividend payout. They are presented in the top panel of Table 4. They 
suggest the following. Irrespective of the dividend payout measure used, better-governed firms always pay 
larger dividends (relative to their earnings, cashflow, or sales) when compared to less well-governed firms. 
For example, the median “High Governance” firm pays out 12.20 percentage points more of its cashflow 
in the form of a dividend than “Low Governance” firms (compare 21.30 for “High Governance” firms to 
9.10 for “Low Governance” firms). The conclusions remain the same when I use either dividends-to-
earnings (%) (Compare 32.80 to 18.00) or dividends-to-sales (%) (Compare 2.90 to 1.50). Admittedly 
while not controlling for other determinants of dividend policy, these summary payout statistics are 
consistent with the outcome model of dividends. That is, dividend payouts are larger in better-governed 
firms. Next, I examine whether this result still holds when I control for other observable determinates of 
corporate dividend policy. The possibility remains that it is firm-level characteristics other than corporate 
governance which explain the differences in dividend payout between well and no so well-governed firms. 
For example, since better-governed firms tend to be more profitable firms with greater cash holdings (see 
Klapper and Love (2004), and Durnev and Kim (2005)), and since both profitability and cash holdings are 
positively related to dividend payout, then either or both of these variables may account for the 
differences in payout policy that we observe between well and not so well-governed firms in Table 4. To 
explore these possibilities, I follow Mitton (2004) and estimate ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) of 
the following form: 
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i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
i c i
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash TE RE
Industry Country
 
(1) 
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8 c 9 c i i
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash TE RE
SR CR Industry
 
(2) 
 
Where DIVi is either dividends-to-earnings (%), dividends-to-cashflow (%), or dividends-to-sales 
(%), and GOVi is the CLSA corporate governance score for each firm. Size, growth, profitability, cash, 
TE, and RE, are firm size, firm growth, firm profitability, firm cash, firm total equity, and firm retained 
earnings (to total assets), respectively. Industryi are industry dummies, CountryC country dummies, SRC 
and CRC, shareholder and creditor rights, respectively.18 Financial firms are excluded. In Equation (2), I 
exclude country dummies when I include shareholder and creditor rights. All regressions are estimated 
with White (1980) standard errors. The coefficient estimates from estimating equations 1 and 2 are 
presented in Table 5.  
The findings presented in Table 5 are in line with Mitton (2004), and others, and provide support 
in favour of the outcome model of dividends. The coefficient estimates on the corporate governance 
variable are always positive and statistically different to zero. Specifically, the coefficient estimates on the 
corporate governance variable range from a low of 0.07 (using dividends to sales (%)) to a high of 0.438 
(using dividends to earnings (%)).19  These coefficient estimates imply that a one standard deviation 
change in corporate governance (14.6), which is close to the difference in the median corporate 
governance score for firms from India (53.4) and Singapore (67.4) changes dividend payout by 6.39 
percentage points using dividends to earnings (%) (0.438 * 14.6), 4.96 percentage points using dividends 
                                                 
18 Firms are designated into one of thirteen industries based on the following classifications using 4-digit SIC codes: 
Agriculture and Food (0100-0999 & 2000-2111); Mining and Construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); 
Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2799); Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-2899); Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); 
Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399); Durable Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); Transportation 
(4000-4899); Utilities (4900-4999); Retail (5000-5999); Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); Computers (7370-
7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679); Public Administration (9000+). 
19 Mitton (2004) estimates variants of equations 1 and 2. His version of equation 1 is the same as mine except that 
he excludes cash, total equity and retained earnings, and excludes these same variables and creditor rights from 
equation 2. Using both dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%), the coefficient estimates on the 
corporate governance variable is comparable across studies. For example, using equation 1, the coefficient estimates 
on the corporate governance variable reported by Mitton (2004) is 0.278 and 0.056 (Using dividends to cashflow (%) 
and dividends to sales (%)), respectively. I report coefficient estimates of 0.270 and 0.070, respectively. Using 
dividends to earnings (%), the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable are much larger in this 
study (0.369) compared to 0.271 in Mitton (2004).       
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to cashflow (%) (0.340 * 14.6), and 1.037 percentage points using dividends to sales (%) (0.071 * 14.6). 
While not always statistically significant, the firm-level control variables are of the correct sign. Large and 
profitable firms pay higher dividends. Growth firms tend to pay lower dividends. Furthermore, and 
consistent with the life-cycle model of dividends, dividend payout (at least using dividends to earnings 
(%)) increases with corporate maturity i.e. when the ratio of retained earnings to total assets increases. 
Finally, I find no evidence to suggest that corporate dividend payouts increase in country-level 
shareholder and creditor rights.20  
In summary, the findings thus far are consistent with Mitton (2004), and many others, and 
provide support for the outcome model of dividends. Shareholders use their legal rights, in this instance 
measured at the firm-level, to extract dividends from firms. Better-governed firms extract the largest 
dividends.    
Next, I turn my attention towards examining the relationship between each of the corporate 
governance provisions and corporate dividend payout. First, consider the bottom panel of Table 4. Here I 
divide the full sample of firms into two groups. The first group is made up of firms with an individual 
corporate governance provision score higher than the sample median. The other group is comprised of 
those firms with an individual corporate governance provision score less than the sample median. For 
both groups of firms and using each dividend payout measure, I outline the median dividend payout. 
They suggest the following. First, a number of the different corporate governance provisions appear to 
influence corporate dividend policy. With the exception of accountability, dividend payout tends to increase 
in all other individual corporate governance provisions. Furthermore, the largest difference in dividend 
payout between the two groups of firms occurs when I differentiate firms by level of responsibility (The 
difference in median dividend payout between high and low responsibility firms is 11.20, 14.85, and 1.20 
when dividend payout is measured as dividends to cashflow (%), dividends to earnings (%), or dividends 
to sales (%), respectively). In the case of independence, the difference in median dividend payouts between 
the two groups of firms is only statistically significant when dividends-to-earnings (%) are the dividend 
payout measure. Second, although the differences in dividend payout are not statistically significant, there 
                                                 
20 Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012) do find support for the outcome model when they use Spamann’s 
(2010) anti-director rights measure.   
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is some evidence that points towards the agency substitution model of dividends when we account 
differences in corporate accountability across firms.   
In the next section, I examine whether these relations still hold when I account for observable 
determinants of corporate dividend policy.      
To do so and again using ordinary least squares, I estimate regressions of the following form: 
 
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
idy c i
DIV GOV PROV Size Growth Pr ofitability Cash TE RE
Industry Country
 
(3) 
COMP
i 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
6 i 7 i 8 i idy c i
DIV GOV PROV GOV PROV Size Growth Pr ofitability
Cash TE RE Industry Country
 
(4) 
 
Where all of the variables are as before, but now (GOV-PROVi) is one of the individual 
corporate governance provisions (i.e. discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness), and (GOV-PROViCOMP) is the complement of each particular corporate 
governance provision. I include the latter variable in order to alleviate potential omitted variable problems 
which may arise given the extent to which the governance provisions are correlated with one another (see 
Table 3). Black et al. (2011) do likewise in their study when they examine the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value. The coefficient estimates from estimating equations 3 and 4 are 
presented in Table 6. 
The top panel of Table 6 contains the coefficient estimates from estimating equation 3, and the 
bottom panel those from estimating equation 4. I use dividends to cashflow (%) as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient estimates suggest the following. When I estimate equations 3 and 4, only 
independence is positive and statistically significant. For example in the top panel, the coefficient estimate 
for independence is 0.163 and statistically significant. This implies that a one standard deviation change in 
independence (26.7) is associated with a 4.35 percentage point increase in dividends to cashflow (%) 
(0.163 * 26.7). In contrast, for all of the other corporate governance provisions, the coefficient estimates 
are lower, and always statistically insignificant. Of the firm-level control variables, only profitability and 
retained earnings are correctly signed and statistically significant. The remaining firm-level controls are of 
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the correct sign, but not statistically significant. The coefficient estimates presented in the bottom panel 
of Table 6 show that independence remains positive and statistically significant even when I include its 
complement (i.e. a variable which is constructed as an equally weighted average of discipline, transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, and fairness). While the influence of independence is lessened (compare coefficient 
estimates of 0.163 in the top panel to 0.141 in the bottom panel), and its level of statistical significance is 
reduced (compare t-stats of 2.16 in the top panel to 1.70 in the bottom panel), it remains positive and 
economically significant. The coefficient estimate for independence from the bottom panel, suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase in independence results in a 3.76 percentage point increase in dividends to 
cashflow (%) (26.7 * 0.141). The remaining governance provisions remain statistically insignificant in the 
bottom panel of Table 6. These findings suggest that dividends are an outcome of greater board independence.     
In Table 7, I estimate equation 4 using dividends to earnings (%) and dividends to sales (%). The 
coefficient estimates using dividends to earnings (%) are presented in the top panel, and the bottom panel 
presents the coefficient estimates for dividends to sales (%). All firm-level, industry and country dummies 
are included but not reported. When I use dividends to earnings (%) as the dependent variable, 
transparency, independence, and accountability are all statistically significant. The coefficient estimates on the 
independence and accountability measures are both positive (0.235 and 0.243, respectively), which 
suggests that dividends are an outcome of both independence and accountability. These coefficient estimates 
suggest a one standard deviation increase in independence and accountability (26.7 & 23.7, respectively) 
increase dividends to earnings (%) by 6.27 (0.235 * 26.7) and 5.76 (0.243 * 23.7) percentage points, 
respectively. In contrast, dividends substitute for transparency i.e. the coefficient estimate on the 
transparency variable is negative (-0.211), which suggests that transparent firms in emerging markets pay 
lower dividends than their opaque counterparts. From an economic significance perspective, the 
coefficient estimate on the transparency variable suggests that a one standard deviation increase in 
corporate transparency (19.9) reduces dividends to earnings (%) by almost 4.2 percentage points (-0.211 * 
19.9). This finding is entirely consistent with recent evidence presented by Brockman and Unlu (2011). 
They show that managers pay higher dividends to establish reputation among providers of external capital 
when they operate in opaque disclosure environments i.e. firms substitute higher dividends for a lack of 
transparency.   
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The bottom panel of Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates using dividends to sales (%). Here 
only accountability maters. The coefficient estimate is 0.035 and statistically significant, suggesting that 
dividend policy is an outcome of corporate accountability. The coefficient estimate implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in accountability (23.7) increases dividends to sales (%) by just over four-fifths of one 
percentage point (i.e. 0.035 * 23.7 is 0.829). The increase in dividends implied by a one standard deviation 
change in corporate accountability is economically large, since it represents since it accounts for almost 38% 
of the dividends paid relative to sales for the median firm (i.e. (0.829/2.2)*100 is 37.68%). All other 
governance provisions, and most notably transparency and independence are not statistically significant in 
these regressions.  
In summary, and using all three dividend payout measures, dividends are an outcome of corporate 
independence and accountability. Of the two, dividends are marginally more sensitive to changes in 
accountability (compare 0.243 (accountability) to 0.235 (independence) in the dividends to earnings regressions). 
In contrast, dividends substitute for transparency. Opaque firms in emerging markets pay higher dividends 
than their transparent peers.  
In the remaining two tables, I examine whether the results just presented are robust to the 
inclusion of shareholder and creditor rights. Almost without exception, they are. Tables 8 and 9 contain 
the coefficient estimates from estimating equation 4, where the country dummies are excluded and 
replaced with measures of shareholder and creditor rights. In both Tables, independence (when using 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to earnings (%)) and accountability (using dividends to earnings 
(%) and dividends to sales (%)) remain positive and statistically significant. The coefficient estimates are 
somewhat reduced but always retain their statistical significance. For example, in the dividends to earnings 
(%) regressions, the coefficient estimates for the independence (accountability) governance provisions are 
0.173 (0.156) compared to 0.235 (0.243) previously. In contrast, given the inclusion of shareholder and 
creditor rights, dividends no longer substitute for transparency. Finally, and in line with the results 
presented in Table 5, neither shareholder nor creditor rights enter significantly in any regression.    
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I examine the relationship between individual corporate governance provisions and 
corporate dividend payout. I do so for a number of reasons. First, much of the recent work in this area 
concentrates on using samples of U.S. and Canadian firms. Even those studies which use emerging 
market firms, can be criticized on the grounds that the focus of their analysis is too narrow, in the sense 
that they focus on specific individual governance provisions, and ignore others, resulting in potential 
omitted-variable bias concerns. In this paper, I endeavour to overcome these aforementioned criticisms 
of the extant literature. First, I focus on emerging market firms using a sample of 220 firms from 21 
emerging market countries. Second, I account for other (composite) governance provisions in regressions 
which have as their primary variable of interest, specific individual corporate governance provisions.  
When I do so, I show, as Mitton (2004) originally does, that dividends are an outcome of strong 
governance. The shareholders of better-governed firms are able to extract the largest dividends from 
firms. On closer inspection, I show that dividend payouts are the highest in firms which score high in 
measures which quantify board independence and accountability. Finally, I uncover some, but not definitive 
evidence, which suggests that opaque firms pay dividends larger than transparent firms. In effect, these 
opaque firms substitute poor governance with high dividends.     
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Table 1 
Sample Description 
This table describes the sample by country. # Firms is the number of firms. For each country, I report the median (MD) and 
standard deviation (SD) of corporate governance, dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales 
(%), respectively. In the remaining columns, I report shareholder rights (SR) data from Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. 
(2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights (CR) data from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-
level data is sourced from Worldscope.  Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).          
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividend Payout Measure Shareholder & 
Creditor Rights 
  Corporate 
Governance 
Dividends to 
Earnings (%) 
Dividends to 
Cashflow (%) 
Dividends to 
Sales (%) 
Shareholder & 
Creditor Rights 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Country # 
Firms 
MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD SR CR 
Argentina 1 66.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 3 1 
Brazil 14 61.8 9.1 31.9 34.3 9.5 27.7 2.9 6.0 5 1 
Chile 7 62.4 4.2 34.8 16.5 11.7 10.5 1.3 1.7 5 2 
China 11 48.2 11.6 28.8 24.7 15.9 17.5 5.8 7.9 1 2 
Colombia 1 53.2 - 66.0 - 82.2 - 6.0 - 4 0 
Hong Kong 25 59.8 14.4 43.1 32.7 46.7 32.2 6.1 9.2 4 4 
Hungary 1 48.5 - 85.5 - 10.6 - 0.5 - 2 1 
India 13 53.4 10.4 19.7 23.6 13.7 28.1 3.4 2.4 4 2 
Indonesia 12 36.3 13.6 23.7 26.0 20.3 26.6 2.0 4.8 4 2 
Korea 13 39.7 5.8 5.9 9.2 3.0 4.9 0.2 0.8 4 3 
Malaysia 22 60.3 12.8 33.4 30.2 27.0 27.5 4.8 5.1 4 3 
Mexico 4 67.0 4.0 28.1 14.9 15.4 8.0 4.0 2.8 2 0 
Pakistan 4 33.6 20.2 76.8 40.7 71.1 36.4 9.7 7.8 5 1 
Peru 1 76.5 - 18.9 - 33.0 - 8.0 - 4 0 
Philippines 12 40.6 12.2 5.3 19.6 0.4 18.6 0.2 1.6 4 1 
Poland 1 37.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 2 1 
Singapore 18 67.4 6.7 44.0 31.9 24.8 29.0 1.9 7.1 4 3 
Sth Africa 16 64.3 16.1 27.5 33.0 22.6 23.3 2.9 7.2 5 3 
Taiwan 31 54.9 9.1 17.4 25.4 9.3 20.2 1.1 3.5 5 2 
Thailand 6 54.6 15.3 46.0 38.8 26.0 20.6 4.6 8.5 4 2 
Turkey 7 46.6 10.6 0.0 20.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.6 4 2 
  Total Sample 
 
  MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD Median 
 220 55.8 14.6 23.4 29.5 15.4 26.4 2.2 6.2 4 2 
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Table 2 
Individual Corporate Governance Provisions 
This table describes the sample by country. # Firms is the number of firms. For each country, I report the median (MD) and 
standard deviation (SD) of discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, and fairness. Corporate 
governance measures are from CLSA (2001).   
  Individual Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
  Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
Country # 
Firms 
MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD 
Argentina 1 66.7 - 70.0 - 78.6 - 62.5 - 50.0 - 72.2 - 
Brazil 14 61.2 20.0 80.0 15.9 64.3 15.9 56.3 15.9 66.7 23.0 33.3 19.2 
Chile 7 55.6 6.0 90.0 19.5 64.3 15.7 37.5 6.1 83.3 8.1 83.3 7.7 
China 11 33.3 16.5 60.0 12.9 64.3 22.8 12.5 19.7 50.0 13.1 83.3 26.8 
Colombia 1 55.6 - 50.0 - 35.7 - 50.0 - 50.0 - 77.8 - 
Hong Kong 25 44.4 24.3 70.0 16.1 42.9 28.7 50.0 25.3 83.3 18.2 83.3 17.7 
Hungary 1 22.2 - 60.0 - 57.1 - 12.5 - 66.7 - 72.2 - 
India 13 66.7 16.9 50.0 14.8 64.3 29.4 50.0 18.4 50.0 16.1 83.3 24.4 
Indonesia 12 33.3 18.0 60.0 13.8 14.3 19.8 18.8 8.4 33.3 19.4 66.7 33.0 
Korea 13 33.3 10.0 50.0 7.5 35.7 13.9 62.5 17.2 33.3 10.7 33.3 23.3 
Malaysia 22 55.6 18.9 65.0 17.7 78.6 21.6 31.3 19.9 50.0 14.2 80.6 22.1 
Mexico 4 72.3 10.6 80.0 18.3 67.9 18.8 56.3 11.9 58.4 9.6 77.8 26.6 
Pakistan 4 27.8 26.5 31.7 19.7 50.0 26.8 36.1 26.6 27.8 26.5 22.3 8.3 
Peru 1 77.8 - 90.0 - 78.6 - 62.5 - 66.7 - 83.3 - 
Philippines 12 33.3 17.4 45.0 12.7 53.6 26.3 25.0 13.5 33.3 16.7 33.3 27.8 
Poland 1 11.1 - 20.0 - 78.6 - 100.0 - 16.7 - 0.0 - 
Singapore 18 66.7 19.5 70.0 14.5 85.7 11.8 50.0 17.7 66.7 13.9 88.9 16.5 
Sth Africa 16 55.6 13.8 50.0 19.0 71.4 25.6 75.0 23.5 66.7 21.1 80.6 23.2 
Taiwan 31 55.6 17.7 50.0 25.0 85.7 11.8 50.0 25.2 50.0 19.7 50.0 26.1 
Thailand 6 27.8 13.4 60.0 13.3 60.8 28.5 62.5 14.6 50.0 23.6 72.2 31.0 
Turkey 7 66.7 17.8 50.0 14.1 28.6 25.9 12.5 25.7 50.0 18.6 16.7 20.4 
  MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD MD SD 
 220 44.4 20.6 60.0 19.9 71.4 26.7 50.0 23.7 50.0 21.4 77.8 27.9 
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Table 3 
Correlation Coefficient, Variance Inflation Factors & Condition Numbers 
This table present correlation coefficients between each corporate governance provision and an index of the remaining 
provisions (their composite), and correlation coefficients between each corporate governance provision and each dividend 
payout measure. Div-Cashflow is dividends to cashflow, Div-Earnings are dividends to earnings, and Div-Sales are dividends to 
sales. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001), and dividend payout measures are sourced from Worldscope. The 
bottom panel reports tests of multicollinearity, namely variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition numbers (Condition). ***, 
**, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.         
  Correlation of each Corporate Governance Provision with their Composite (An equally-weighted 
average of the other five individual governance provisions)  
 
  Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
  Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
Correlations  0.456*** 0.435*** 0.430*** 0.275*** 0.563*** 0.334*** 
  Correlations of Corporate Governance Provisions with each Dividend Payout Measure 
 
  Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
Div-Cashflow  0.096 0.038 0.097 0.097 0.253*** 0.255*** 
Div-Earnings  0.078 0.075 0.169** 0.138** 0.259*** 0.182*** 
Div-Sales  0.024 0.118* 0.082 0.076 0.278*** 0.225*** 
Average  0.066 0.077 0.116 0.104 0.263 0.221 
  Multicollinearity Tests 
 
  Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
VIF  1.34 1.38 1.33 1.25 1.53 1.34 
Condition   5.04 6.08 4.66 4.05 5.17 4.74 
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Table 4 
Univariate Statistics 
This table present summary median dividend payouts by strength of corporate governance. Median dividend payout is 
presented for firms with high and low corporate governance, discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, 
responsibility, and fairness. Div-Cashflow is dividends to cashflow (%), Div-Earnings dividends to earnings (%), and Div-Sales 
dividends to sales (%). Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001), and dividend payout measures are sourced from 
Worldscope.          
 Composite Corporate Governance Measure 
 
 Full Sample High Governance Low Governance Difference 
(High – Low) 
Div-Cashflow (%) 15.40 21.30 9.10 12.20*** 
Div-Earnings (%) 23.40 32.80 18.00 14.80*** 
Div-Sales (%) 2.20 2.90 1.50 1.40*** 
 Individual Corporate Governance Provisions 
 
 Discipline 
 
 Transparency  
 High 
Discipline 
Low 
Discipline 
Difference 
(High – Low) 
High 
Transparency 
Low 
Transparency 
Difference 
(High – Low) 
Div-Cashflow (%) 16.70 8.50 8.20* 20.90 13.25 7.65* 
Div-Earnings (%) 27.05 15.85 11.20* 29.95 19.85 10.10* 
Div-Sales (%) 2.65 1.60 1.05* 2.70 1.95 0.75** 
 Independence 
 
 Accountability  
 High 
Independence 
Low 
Independence 
Difference 
(High – Low) 
High 
Accountability 
Low 
Accountability 
Difference 
(High – Low) 
Div-Cashflow (%) 18.40 12.30 6.10 16.05 14.80 1.25 
Div-Earnings (%) 26.40 19.70 6.70* 21.00 23.90 (2.90) 
Div-Sales (%) 2.50 1.70 0.80 1.90 2.40 (0.50) 
 Responsibility 
 
 Fairness  
 High 
Responsibility 
Low 
Responsibility 
Difference 
(High – Low) 
High Fairness Low Fairness Difference 
(High – Low) 
Div-Cashflow (%) 21.65 10.45 11.20*** 21.20 8.50 12.70*** 
Div-Earnings (%) 33.90 19.05 14.85*** 29.50 18.60 10.90*** 
Div-Sales (%) 2.80 1.60 1.20*** 3.40 1.50 1.90*** 
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Table 5 
Regression Estimates 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%), dividends to 
earnings (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. Size is the log of book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic one-year asset 
growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book assets, cash is cash to assets, and total equity to total assets, 
retained earnings is retained earnings to total assets. In columns (1), (3), and (5) a full set of country and industry dummies are 
included, but not reported. The country dummies are excluded from columns (2), (4), and (6). Shareholder rights data is from 
Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights data is from Djankov, 
McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA 
(2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividend Payout Measure 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) Dividends to Earnings (%) Dividends to Sales (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.270* 
(1.91) 
0.340*** 
(3.05) 
0.369** 
(2.20) 
0.438*** 
(3.44) 
0.070** 
(2.12) 
0.071*** 
(2.86) 
       
Size 
 
0.615 
(0.42) 
0.219 
(0.18) 
1.862 
(1.08) 
1.554 
(1.04) 
0.547* 
(1.66) 
0.442* 
(1.68) 
Growth 
 
2.691 
(0.22) 
2.893 
(0.27) 
-29.690** 
(2.06) 
-27.235** 
(2.18) 
-3.065 
(1.02) 
-2.359 
(0.91) 
Profitability 
 
26.156 
(1.49) 
20.806 
(1.42) 
18.308 
(0.80) 
8.653 
(0.48) 
12.467*** 
(3.04) 
10.816*** 
(2.88) 
Cash 
 
7.611 
(0.52) 
11.278 
(0.86) 
8.099 
(0.44) 
9.541 
(0.57) 
3.731 
(0.97) 
4.354 
(1.19) 
Total Equity (TE) 
 
8.712 
(0.67) 
13.970 
(1.21) 
15.975 
(1.11) 
20.804 
(1.56) 
8.893*** 
(3.10) 
8.897*** 
(3.48) 
Retained Earnings (RE)  
 
9.548 
(1.51) 
5.821 
(1.03) 
16.864** 
(2.46) 
13.471** 
(2.15) 
0.475 
(0.49) 
0.214 
(0.23) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
 0.382 
(0.24) 
 -0.485 
(0.21) 
 -0.425 
(0.97) 
Creditor Rights 
 
 3.004 
(1.46) 
 1.588 
(0.69) 
 0.475 
(1.08) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.457 0.390 0.388 0.306 0.508 0.448 
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Table 6 
Regression estimates using individual corporate governance provisions 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%). Size is the log of 
book assets in US$, growth is logarithmic one-year asset growth, profitability is earnings before interest and taxation to book 
assets, cash is cash to assets, and total equity to total assets, retained earnings is retained earnings to total assets. The bottom 
panel includes ‘Governance – Comp’ as an additional regressor. ‘Governance – Comp’ is an equally-weighted average of the 
other five governance sub-indices. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from 
CLSA (2001). Industry and country fixed effects are included but not reported. # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and 
* denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
0.066 
(0.76) 
-0.027 
(0.35) 
0.163** 
(2.16) 
0.127 
(1.35) 
0.104 
(1.10) 
0.080 
(1.20) 
       
Size 
 
0.048 
(0.03) 
-0.186 
(0.13) 
0.563 
(0.41) 
0.073 
(0.05) 
0.139 
(0.10) 
0.135 
(0.09) 
Growth 
 
3.874 
(0.33) 
4.026 
(0.34) 
3.184 
(0.26) 
4.067 
(0.34) 
2.848 
(0.23) 
3.092 
(0.26) 
Profitability 
 
25.999 
(1.46) 
25.754 
(1.42) 
26.282 
(1.52) 
30.249* 
(1.66) 
24.451 
(1.38) 
23.909 
(1.29) 
Cash 
 
9.385 
(0.63) 
8.843 
(0.57) 
7.676 
(0.52) 
8.886 
(0.60) 
7.587 
(0.50) 
7.275 
(0.47) 
Total Equity (TE) 
 
8.595 
(0.66) 
8.615 
(0.66) 
7.128 
(0.56) 
10.030 
(0.77) 
8.443 
(0.66) 
8.907 
(0.67) 
Retained Earnings (RE)  
 
9.688 
(1.60) 
10.571* 
(1.82) 
10.645* 
(1.90) 
9.950 
(1.50) 
10.132* 
(1.69) 
10.489* 
(1.75) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.448 0.446 0.459 0.453 0.450 0.450 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.010 
(0.08) 
-0.135 
(1.62) 
0.141* 
(1.70) 
0.092 
(0.93) 
0.036 
(0.35) 
0.061 
(0.90) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.272* 
(1.84) 
0.389** 
(2.50) 
0.111 
(0.73) 
0.175 
(1.26) 
0.233* 
(1.66) 
0.208 
(1.53) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.458 0.467 0.461 0.458 0.457 0.457 
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Table 7 
Regression estimates using alternative dividend payout measures 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), or dividends to 
sales (%), as indicated. Country and industry fixed effects, and firm-level controls are included, but not reported. ‘Governance – 
Comp’ is an equally-weighted average of the other five governance sub-indices. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. 
Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.047 
(0.35) 
-0.211* 
(1.81) 
0.235** 
(2.32) 
0.243** 
(2.34) 
0.073 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(0.03) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.406** 
(2.21) 
0.556*** 
(3.05) 
0.102 
(0.58) 
0.119 
(0.74) 
0.295* 
(1.78) 
0.371** 
(2.21) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.390 0.405 0.399 0.399 0.387 0.390 
 Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.010 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.020 
(1.01) 
0.035* 
(1.80) 
0.010 
(0.20) 
0.010 
(0.40) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.074** 
(2.23) 
0.066* 
(1.94) 
0.049 
(1.56) 
0.034 
(1.00) 
0.064** 
(2.09) 
0.064* 
(1.84) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.509 0.508 0.508 0.512 0.508 0.508 
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Table 8 
Regression estimates using individual corporate governance provisions & shareholder and creditor rights 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to cashflow (%). ‘Governance – 
Comp’ is an equally-weighted average of the other five governance sub-indices. Shareholder rights data is from Spamann (2009) 
and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights data is from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer 
(2007). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). Industry and 
country fixed effects are included but not reported. # Firms is the number of firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividends to Cashflow (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.020 
(0.27) 
-0.082 
(0.92) 
0.108* 
(1.65) 
0.081 
(1.04) 
0.098 
(1.02) 
0.088 
(1.56) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.355*** 
(3.09) 
0.401*** 
(3.24) 
0.220 
(1.59) 
0.261** 
(2.49) 
0.242* 
(1.94) 
0.249** 
(2.15) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
0.594 
(0.36) 
0.427 
(0.27) 
0.376 
(0.24) 
0.297 
(0.19) 
0.315 
(0.20) 
0.649 
(0.39) 
Creditor Rights 
 
2.947 
(1.44) 
2.507 
(1.22) 
3.075 
(1.48) 
3.053 
(1.50) 
2.993 
(1.45) 
2.781 
(1.34) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.393 0.397 0.392 0.390 0.391 0.391 
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Table 9 
Regression estimates using individual corporate governance provisions & shareholder and creditor rights 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath 
in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), or dividends to 
sales (%), as indicated. ‘Governance – Comp’ is an equally-weighted average of the other five governance sub-indices. 
Shareholder rights data is from Spamann (2009) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and Poland), and creditor rights 
data is from Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance 
measures are from CLSA (2001). Industry and country fixed effects are included but not reported. # Firms is the number of 
firms, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Dividends to Earnings (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.140 
(1.27) 
-0.079 
(0.71) 
0.173** 
(2.04) 
0.156** 
(1.98) 
0.191 
(1.55) 
0.059 
(0.86) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.565*** 
(3.87) 
0.494*** 
(3.25) 
0.241 
(1.58) 
0.289** 
(2.44) 
0.248* 
(1.78) 
0.380*** 
(2.76) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
0.101 
(0.04) 
-0.436 
(0.19) 
-0.497 
(0.22) 
-0.778 
(0.34) 
-0.679 
(0.29) 
-0.604 
(0.26) 
Creditor Rights 
 
1.422 
(0.64) 
1.044 
(0.46) 
1.723 
(0.75) 
1.748 
(0.76) 
1.548 
(0.68) 
1.696 
(0.74) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.322 0.313 0.311 0.310 0.310 0.306 
 Dividends to Sales (%) 
 Corporate Governance Provision 
 Discipline Transparency Independence Account Responsibility Fairness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corporate Governance 
 
-0.026 
(1.51) 
0.012 
(0.62) 
0.012 
(0.69) 
0.028** 
(2.01) 
0.022 
(0.95) 
0.013 
(1.01) 
       
Governance - Comp 
 
0.094*** 
(3.41) 
0.059** 
(2.20) 
0.059** 
(2.28) 
0.044** 
(1.92) 
0.049** 
(2.08) 
0.057* 
(1.92) 
Shareholder Rights 
 
-0.322 
(0.71) 
-0.425 
(0.96) 
-0.425 
(0.96) 
-0.482 
(1.10) 
-0.441 
(1.00) 
-0.411 
(0.92) 
Creditor Rights 
 
0.445 
(1.04) 
0.477 
(1.08) 
0.476 
(1.08) 
0.505 
(1.16) 
0.472 
(1.08) 
0.464 
(1.05) 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country Dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-Squared 0.459 0.448 0.448 0.451 0.448 0.448 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
